Statement

Secretary Leila de Lima should stop using brute reason in interpreting the Court of Appeals ruling dismissing the case against me which she claimed she has not even read.

Let me remind her that in a civil and common law system like ours, the hierarchy of courts places the Supreme Court at the highest level and is therefore the sole authority to reverse the court of appeals in its ruling and decision - not any of the lower courts of the land and certainly not the Secretary of Justice.

The appellate court has ruled that there is no probable cause to indict me for two counts of murder and categorically nullified the warrant of arrest that the Manila RTC Branch 18 issued against me. De Lima cannot place herself above any court of law. Otherwise, the justice system becomes defective and worse, will self-destruct.

While I submit that the case dismissal is not yet final, as it may still be reconsidered by the same Court of Appeals division or can be reversed by the Supreme Court following proper legal rules and procedures, the same ruling clearly nullified the warrant of arrest which de

Lima wants to defy by ordering to continue the manhunt.

I and my family have suffered long enough for a crime I did not commit. I appeal to her not to confuse the public with her flawed and ill-advised legal opinion. It is hitting below the intellect but is inflicting the damage that some of her prosecutors have intended to achieve to cover up for their malicious prosecution.

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Press Statement by Sen. Lacson's Lawyers

The counsel for Senator Panfilo M. Lacson today cautioned the Department of Justice and law enforcement agencies from implementing the warrant of arrest that was nullified and set aside by the Court of Appeals last Thursday.

“If he decides to come out and they arrest him on the basis of the warrant that has already been set aside, we will file cases against the authorities and the DOJ, if they instructed to do so, for arbitrary detention or illegal arrest,” said lawyer Alexander Poblador.

Under the Constitution, he said the general rule is that a person is entitled to personal liberty at all times except if there is an outstanding arrest warrant against him.

“Since the arrest warrants have been nullified, there is no more basis to deprive him of his liberty. A person is entitled to immediate liberty, particularly considering that he is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and not until the appeal or motion for consideration is over,” Poblador said.

Citing Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, Poblador said judgments in actions for injunction “shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken there from.”

Also, Poblador said Rule 117, Section 5 of the same rules provides that the quashing of the information is immediately executory unless there is an order to file new information. “In the case of Senator Lacson, there is none,” he added.

The rules clearly provide that if the accused is in custody, he “shall be discharged.” It necessarily follows that if the accused is not yet in custody, he shall no longer be put in custody, considering that no less than the Court of Appeals quashed or dismissed the information against Senator Lacson, Poblador said.

He described the nullification of the arrest warrants as an “interlocutory” order which jurisprudence defines as an order not instantly appealable and therefore cannot be suspended or interrupted by a motion for consideration.

Further quoting jurisprudence, Poblador said “it is even well settled that a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction.”

He further explained that arrest warrants are obviously mere ancillary to the main criminal case and are therefore deemed automatically lifted when the criminal cases against Senator Lacson were dismissed.

“Therefore, the nullification of the arrest warrant is immediately executory,” he said.

Poblador said although the other parties may still file a petition for review with the Supreme Court, the pendency of such petition cannot stay the execution of the judgment which is the subject thereof, in the absence of any preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court.

This is precisely why Rule 45, Section 1 provides that a petition for review “may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction.” Note that there is no assurance that the Supreme Court will even entertain or give due course to a petition for review, as its power of review is “not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion,” he said.

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